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) 
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APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Richard Wagner asks the Idaho Court of Appeals to withdraw its opinion, 2015 
Unpublished Opinion No. 391 (Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2015) (hereinafter, Opinion), and rehear 
this case. He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed the order summarily dismissing 
his petition for post conviction relief, was based on a rationale that had not been 
presented to or decided by the district court. As a result, the decision to affirm the 
summary dismissal on that basis violated the notice requirements in the post conviction 
statutes, and thus, the due process protections of the state and federal constitutions. 
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Therefore, this Court should rehear this case and decide whether summary 
dismissal was appropriate based on the issues of which Mr. \J\/agner had the requisite 
notice and the opportunity to address in the district court. On rehearing, this Court 
should reverse the order summarily dismissing the petition, vacate the judgment in this 
case, and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing because Mr. Wagner did present 
sufficient facts to establish a genuine issue of material fact. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedin s 
In the underlying criminal case, Mr. Wagner pied guilty, pursuant to a plea 
agreement, to one count of lewd conduct, and in exchange, the State dismissed two 
other counts, as well as the Information Part II alleging a prior sexually-based 
conviction, and the State also agreed to recommend a unified sentence of thirty years, 
with ten years fixed. (R., p.65; Supp. R., pp.77-79; Supp. Tr., p.4, Ls.12-20.)1 Prior to 
the entry of this plea, the State had filed a motion to introduce evidence of Mr. Wagner's 
previous convictions as evidence of a common plan or scheme pursuant to I.R.E. 
404(b) at trial. (Supp. R., pp.56-60; see also R., pp.65-66; Tr., Vol.2, p.6, L.15 - p.7, 
L.20.) The district court ultimately imposed a unified sentence of thirty years, with eight 
1 The district court took judicial notice of "the entire underlying criminal file" from the 
underlying criminal case. (R., p.52.) That documents from that file were provided in 
independently bound and paginated volumes. To avoid confusion, reference to the 
record or transcripts from that file will be identified as "Supp." Additionally, the 
transcripts from hearings in the post conviction case are contained in two independently 
bound and paginated volumes. To avoid confusion, "Vol.1" will refer to the volume 
containing the transcript of the status conference held on June 17, 2013. "Vol.2" will 
refer to the volume containing the transcript of the hearing on the State's motion for 
summary dismissal held on July 17, 2013. 
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years fixed. (R., p.66.) Mr. Wagner did not appeal from the judgment of conviction. 
(R., p.5.) 
However, Mr. Wagner did file a timely pro se petition for post conviction relief, 
alleging, inter alia, that his trial counsel had "failed to argue to keep his prior record out 
of court records." (R., pp.5-6.) The district court appointed counsel, who clarified that 
this was a claim alleging that Mr. Wagner's guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary because trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(R., p.57.) Specifically, post conviction counsel clarified that the ineffective assistance 
was that trial counsel inaccurately told Mr. Wogner that he would lose at trial because of 
his prior record, and, if he went to trial, he would be sentenced to life in prison. Based 
on those assertions by counsel, Mr. Wagner pied guilty despite believing in his factual 
innocence. (Tr., Vol.1, p.6, L.15 - p.7, L.20; R., pp.73-74.) 
The State filed an answer denying Mr. Wagner's allegations. (R., pp.26-28.) It 
also moved for summary dismissal of this claim because "[t]he defendant's prior criminal 
history is always relevant at sentencing and it is not for counsel of record to try and 
'keep it out."' (R., pp.34-35.) It renewed that motion after counsel had been appointed 
to represent Mr. Wagner. (R., pp.41, 47-48.) The State's motion was discussed during 
two subsequent hearings. (See generally Tr., Vols.1-2.) The State did not add any 
other arguments in support of its request for summary judgment in either its renewed 
motion or at the hearings. ( See, e.g., Tr. Vol.1, p.6, Ls.18-21.) The district court took 
the arguments under advisement and subsequently filed a notice of intent to summarily 
dismiss the petition. (Tr., Vol.2, p.9, L.20; R., pp.65-72.) 
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The district court decided that summary dismissal was appropriate because the 
answers Mr. Wagner gave during the plea colloquy and in the guilty pica questionnaire 
were evidence which disproved his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(R., pp.69-70.) The district court stated, "[s]ince this Court is the trier of fact, it is not 
constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary 
disposition; rather, it is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from 
uncontroverted evidence." (R., p.7·1.) Based on this reasoning, it considered 
Mr. Wagner's claims in light of his answers in the guilty plea colloquy and questionnaire. 
(R., pp.69-70.) For example, "[h]is assertion now that he was 'factually innocent' is 
directly contradicted by the record." (R., p.70.) In reaching those conclusions, the 
district court essentially weighed the evidence presented in Mr. Wagner's affidavit 
against the evidence presented in the guilty plea colloquy and questionnaire, and made 
a credibility determination in favor of Mr. Wagner's statements in the plea colloquy. 
(See R., pp.69-71.) The district court also determined that Mr. Wagner had not 
presented a valid claim for relief in regard to counsel's advice about his prior record 
because "it is neither a trial counsel's obligation nor counsel's responsibility to hide a 
prior record from a sentencing court." (R., p.69.) 
In response to the notice of intent to dismiss, Mr. Wagner filed an affidavit in 
which he alleged that counsel had told him that, if he did not answer the questions in the 
plea colloquy and on the guilty plea questionnaire "correctly," the district court would not 
accept his guilty plea, although he did note that his trial attorney did not advise him to lie 
in his responses. (R., p.74.) 
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t'Jevertheless, the district court summarily dismissed Mr. Wagner's petition 
because it was based on "bare and conclusory statements that were addressed in the 
Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss. The petitioner has failed to introduce any new 
evidence to support his allegations." (R., pp.76-77; R., p.86.) Mr. Wagner timely 
appealed from that decision. (R., pp. 78-79.) 
This case was assigned to the Court of Appeals, which issued an unpublished 
opinion affirming the order summarily dismissing Mr. Wagner's petition for post 
conviction release. Wagner v. State, 2015 Unpublished Opinion No. 391 (Ct. App. 
Mar. 4, 2015). The Court of Appeals noted that a petition for post conviction relief could 
be dismissed if the petition did not show that "'a decision to reject the plea bargain 
would have been rational under the circumstances."' Id., at p.6 (quoting Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010)). Given that observation, the Court of Appeals 
determined that Mr. Wagner had failed to show prejudice as required by Padilla 
because "[t]aking all of these facts into consideration and balancing them against the 
evidence presented by [Mr.] Wagner--[Mr.] Wagner's contention that he would have 
asked to go to trial but for defense counsel's deficient performance--we are not 
persuaded that rejecting the plea bargain he ultimately accepted would have been 
rational under the circumstances." Id. at p. 7 (emphasis from original). As a result, the 
Court of Appeals held: "[Mr.] Wagner did not make a prima facie showing of prejudice, 
and because there was no genuine issue of material fact, the State was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court 
summarily dismissing [Mr.] Wagner's petition for post-conviction relief." Id. 
Mr. Wagner filed a timely petition for rehearing. 
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ISSUES 
1. Whether the lclaho Court of Appeals' Opinion affirmed the district court's order 
summarily dismissing Mr. Wagner's petition for post conviction relief on a basis 
for which Mr. Wagner did not have notice or an opportunity to respond. 
2. Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. Wagner's petition 
for post conviction relief even though he presented evidence sufficient to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
inion Affirmed The District Court's Order Summarily 
Dismissing Mr. Wagner's Petition For Post Conviction fselief On A Basis For Which 
Mr. Wa ner Did Not Have Notice Or An O ortunit To Res ond 
The statutes governing post conviction proceedings allow for summary dismissal 
of a petition for relief only if it does not present a genuine issue of material fact. 
I.C. § 19-4906(b ). However, that statute also provides that: 
When a court is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or 
motion, and the record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction 
relief and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings, it may 
indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its 
reasons for so doing. The applicant shall be given an opportunity to 
reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal. In light of the reply, or 
on default thereof, the court may order the application dismissed or grant 
leave to file an amended application or, direct that the proceedings 
otherwise continue. Disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper 
if there exists a material issue of fact. 
Id. (emphasis added). As a result, "[a) petitioner is entitled to notice of the trial court's 
contemplated grounds for dismissal and an opportunity to respond before a petition for 
post-conviction relief is dismissed. Failure to provide such notice and opportunity to be 
heard may result in reversal of a summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction 
relief." Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676 (2010) (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b)); 
cf. Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 321 (1995). The reason that reversal of the 
order summarily dismissing the petition is the proper remedy is that the failure to 
provide notice and the opportunity to be heard constitutes a violation of the 
constitutional rights to due process. See U.S. CONST. amend.XIV; IDAHO CONST. art. I, 
§ 13. 
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Notice may be provided by the State in a motion for summarily dismissal or by 
the district court in a notice of intent to dismiss. See Workman v. State, 144 !daho 518, 
524 (2007) In either case, that notice must be sufficiently particular as to the basis for 
summary dismissal, both in terms of the facts and legal analysis, "so as to enable the 
applicant to supplement the application with the necessary additional facts, if they exist." 
Crabtree v. State, 144 Idaho 489, 494 (Ct. App. 2006). 
In this case, the State filed a motion to summarily dismiss Mr. Wagner's petition 
for post conviction relief, which it renewed after Mr. Wagner was appointed post 
conviction counsel. (R., pp.29-36, 4 7-48.) Hearings were held at which time the State's 
motion was discussed. (See generally Tr., Vols.1-2.) All the State argued was that 
summary judgment was appropriate because Mr. Wagner's claims were disproved by 
the record or additional evidence submitted by the State (namely, an affidavit from trial 
counsel). (R., pp.34-36.) The district court also issued its own notice of intent to 
dismiss. (R., pp.64-72.) In that notice, the district court only determined that summary 
judgment was appropriate because Mr. Wagner's claims of deficient performance were 
either disproved by the record or consisted of only bare and conclusory allegations. 
(R., pp.68-71.) 
At no time during those proceedings was Mr. Wagner informed that his petition 
could be summarily dismissed because his verified allegation of prejudice was 
insufficient for the specific reason he had not presented sufficient evidence to show that 
it would have been rational for him to reject the plea agreement, nor was he given the 
opportunity to develop the record to disprove such an assertion. (See generally 
R., pp.29-36, 47-48, 64-72; Tr. Vols.1-2.) As such, the decision to affirm the summary 
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judgment on that basis violates the notice requirernent because Mr. Wagner was not 
informed of the specific legal analysis or facts upon which the summary judgment vvas 
validated, nor was he given the meaningful opportunity to respond to that legal analysis 
and those facts. 
Furthermore; the appeal is not the appropriate venue to resolve this issue. As 
has long been the case, "[n]ew issues cannot be framed in this court, nor can new or 
additional evidence be presented on appeal." Morrow v. Wm. Berklund Forest Products 
Co., 8"1 Idaho 428, 443 (1959) (opinion of the Court on the respondent's petition for 
rehearing). Resolution of such issues "must await an appropriate setting wherein the 
issues are framed, the facts disclosed and supported by the record, and all parties 
protected in their right to litigate tile question." Saviors v. Richey, 96 Idaho 413, 417 
(197 4 ). Thus, this nevv issue is not appropriately decided on appeal; rather, the case 
should be remanded and the issue first addressed by the district court after the parties 
are able to fully litigate the issue. 
In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has refused to rule on an issue not raised in the 
district court when reviewing a decision to summarily dismissed a petition for post 
conviction relief. Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 730-31 (2008). Specifically, the Court 
held: 
If we relied upon the affidavit to hold that the district court erred, we would 
be deciding the appeal on an issue not raised or argued by Pizzuto. See, 
Sprinkler Irr. Co., Inc. v. John Deere Ins. Co., Inc., 139 Idaho 691, 85 P.3d 
667 (2004) (where the plaintiff did not argue to the trial court that its 
verified complaint provided sufficient material facts to counter the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment, this Court would not consider 
that argument on appeal). 
Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at 730-31. 
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While Pizzuto was applying this rule against the petitioner for failing to argue tl1e 
issue below, the same rule should be applied when the State does not argue, or the 
district court does not rule on 1 a particular issue. Enforcing disparate procedural rules 
between the accused and State violates the protections of tt1e Due Process Clause. 
See, e.g. 1 Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 n.6 (1973) ("This Court has therefore 
been particularly suspicious of state trial rules which provide nonreciprocal benefits to 
the State when the !ack of reciprocity interferes with the defendant's ability to secure a 
fair trial."). In this case, forcing defendant-petitioners to raise issues before the district 
court, but allowing the State to argue issues not preserved for appeal, or worse, 
allowing the appellate court to decide a factual issue sua sponte without any argument 
from either party, allows for nonreciprocal benefits to the State that interferes with the 
defendant-petitioner's ability to secure a fair review of alleged errors in the trial court 
proceedings. 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal's determination - that it was "not persuaded 
that rejecting the plea bargain he ultimately accepted would have been rational under 
the circumstances." Opinion, p.7 (emphasis from original) - constitutes an improper 
weighing of the evidence during summary dismissal proceedings. See, e.g., Vanderford 
Co., Inc., v. Knudson, 150 Idaho 664, 67 4 (2011) ("judging credibility is not appropriate 
during summary judgment proceedings where no evidentiary hearing has been held."); 
Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 419 (2012) (quoting 
Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670 (Ct. App. 1984 )) ("credibility determinations 
'should not be made on summary judgment .... "'). This is particularly true at the 
appellate level because, as the Idaho Supreme Court has held: 
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In determining whether substantial evidence exists, this Court may not 
weigh the evidence, attempt to judge the credibility of witnesses, or 
compare its factual findings with those of the jury. Instead, this Court must 
review the evidence as a whole, drawing all inferences in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party and viewing the facts as if the 
moving party had admitted the truth of all the non-moving party's 
evidence. The Court will not examine any conflicting evidence presented 
by the moving party to refute the non-moving party's claims. Whether 
there was sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact for the jury is a 
pure question of law over which this Court exercises free review. 
Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 136-37 (2009) (emphasis added) (internal citations 
and quotations omitted). Rather, if there are such questions, "[b]ecause appellate 
review on this issue is more limited, we remand to the district court to weigh the 
evidence in the first instance .... " Soria v. Sierra Pacific Airlines, Inc., ·111 Idaho 594, 
610 ('1986) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). Thus, the weighing of tt1e 
reasonableness of Mr. \f\/8gner's assertion that he would not have pied guilty is not an 
appropriate part of the appellate review. 
Applying the limited standard of review in this case, liberally construing facts in 
favor of Mr. Wagner, shows there is a reasonable probability that Mr. Wagner would not 
have pied guilty at the time he did so, and that is enough to establish a genuine issue of 
material fact on the issue of prejudice. See Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 621 (2011) 
(to sufficiently allege prejudice so as to withstand a claim for summary judgment, the 
petitioner need only show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.") 
(emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). Construing all the facts in Mr. Wagner's 
favor, it is reasonable that he would not have plead guilty so that he could pursue a 
challenge to the State's notice of intent to present evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 404(b). 
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After all, the question is not whether Mr. Wagner would stiil ultimately have 
sought trial. See Booth, 15·1 Idaho at 621. Rather, the question is whether, had 
counsel performed sufficiently and challenged the inappropriate propensity evidence 
under I.R.E. 404(b), would Mr. Wagner have accepted this plea offer at the time he did 
so? As the Court of Appeals has pointed out, a genuine issue of fact may exist "as to 
whether a motion to suppress would have been successful and, therefore, whether 
counsel was ineffective for failing to file such a motion." Hoffman v. State, 153 Idaho 
898, 906 (Ct. App. 20·12) (discussing Lint v. State, 145 Idaho 472, 480 (Ct. App. 2008)). 
Thus, the issue in this case is whether it would have been reasonable for Mr. Wagner to 
reject the plea offer on the table so that counsel could raise a viable pretrial challenge to 
the State's proposed use of improper propensity evidence. That would have been a 
reasonable decision for Mr. Wagner to make. 
As such, even if this issue is properly resolved on appeal, it should have been 
resolved in Mr. Wagner's favor. His verified affidavit presented a reasonable probability 
that he would have rationally rejected the plea offer and demanded to continue toward 
trial, and thus, presented a genuine issue of material fact that counsel's deficient 
performance prejudiced him. 
Therefore, this Court should withdraw the Opinion in this case since that opinion 
was based on an issue which was not raised before the district court and Mr. Wagner 
was not given the required notice and opportunity to respond to that potential ground for 
summary dismissal. 
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IL 
The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissin J Mr. Wagner's Petition For Post 
Conviction Relief Even Though He Presented Evidence Sufficient To Raise A Genuine 
Issue Of Material Fact 
A. Introduction 
As to the rationales for summary dismissal for which Mr. Wagner did have notice 
and the opportunity to be heard, summary dismissal was inappropriate on those 
grounds, as Mr. Wagner presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, "[a] court is 
required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true . . . ."2 
Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho ·148, 153 (2007); Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 
321 (1995). Additionally, during the summary judgment phase, the courts ''liberally 
construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party."3 
Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 878, 881 (Ct. App. 2008); see also Charboneau v. State, 
140 Idaho 789, 792 (2004) ("[l]nferences [are] liberally construed in favor of the 
petitioner."). When a genuine issue of material fact exists and would, if resolved in the 
petitioner's favor, entitle the petitioner for relief, the district court must conduct an 
evidentiary hearing. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153; Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518 
(1998). 
2 Where, as in this case, the State files an answer that denies the allegations in the 
verified petition (R., pp.26-28), those denials do not affirmatively disprove the 
allegations. Rather, they only create genuine issues of material fact in regard to those 
issues, specifically, whether or not the petitioner's allegations are factually accurate. 
Because a genuine issue of material fact exists in such cases, summary dismissal is 
inappropriate. Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153. 
3 In this case, the State is the moving party. (R., pp.29-36.) Therefore, the facts and 
reasonable inferences are liberally construed in Mr. Wagner's favor. Charboneau, 140 
Idaho at 792; Nevarez, 145 Idaho at 881. 
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To show a genuine issue of material fact in regard to a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the petitioner must allege facts which demonstrate that counsel's 
petiormance fell below a reasonable standard and that the petitioner was prejudiced by 
that deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 ('1984 ); 
McKeeth v. State, ·140 Idaho 847, 850 (2004). In regard to the second prong of the 
Strickland test, a petitioner shows prejudice when he demonstrates that there is a 
reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different, or, in other words, 
he must undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; 
McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570 (2010). In cases where, as here, the petitioner 
alleges ineffective assistance relating to his decision to accept a plea offer, he must 
show "'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."' Booth, ·151 Idaho at 621 
(quoting Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 676 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985))). 
This means that he has to show a reasonable probability that he would have rejected 
this plea offer to purse a trial, which would include pretrial motions in limine (such as a 
challenge to a notice of intent to present evidence pursuant to 1.R.E. 404(b)). 
Furthermore, in order to be a valid guilty plea, the plea must be made knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily. !.C.R. 11; see, e.g., State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 97 
(2007) ("Manifest injustice occurs if this standard requiring a voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent waiver is not met."). If a defendant enters a plea without adequate knowledge 
of the potential penalties to which his plea will subject him, it is not a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary plea. State v. Shook, 144 Idaho 858, 859-60 (Ct. App. 2007). 
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B. Mr. Wa ner Presented A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That His Trial Attome 
Was Ineffective For Not ChallenginJ The Admissibilit Of His Prior Record At 
Trial 
·L Mr. Wa ner's Claim That His Trial Attorne Was Ineffective For Not 
Challenging The Admissibilit{ Of His Prior Record At Trial Was Not 
Waived By Post Conviction Counsel 
In the initial appellate briefing in this case, the State contended that this Court 
cannot consider Mr. Wagner's claim that his attorney was ineffective for not fighting 
against the State's request to present the facts underlying two prior convictions at trial -
because post conviction counsel purportedly waived the claim below. (Resp. Br., pp.10-
11.) The Opinion notes that "It is not apparent from the record that [Mr.] Wagner 
actually waived lhe ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning the plea 
bargaining process. Moreover, the district court did not treat the claim as waived; it 
addressed the merits in its notice of intent to dismiss." Opinion, p.5 n.4. However, the 
Court of Appeals did not actually decide that issue, as it found the merits of the claim 
dispositive. Id. 
Post conviction counsel did not waive this issue below. Rather, he was 
explaining that there were several different ways that the claim, as articulated in 
Mr. Wagner's pro se petition, could be interpreted. As such, post conviction counsel 
was directing the district court to the proper interpretation of the claim Mr. Wagner 
wanted to pursue and only conceding that the alternate interpretations did not constitute 
bases for relief. Post conviction counsel did not concede the argument that Mr. Wagner 
intended to pursue. In fact, he reiterated the request for an evidentiary hearing on that 
claim in his brief and at the summary disposition hearing. (R., p.57; Tr., Vol.2, p.7, 
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Ls.15-20.) The fact that post conviction counsel continued to request an evidentiary 
hearing on this ciaim affirmatively demonstrates that he was not conceding the issue. 
To that point, post conviction counsel noted in his memorandum in support of 
Mr. Wagner's petition that "Petitioner's pleading [on this issue] is confusing." (R., p.56.) 
In his prose petition, Mr. Wagner claimed, "Counsel did not fight to keep ·13 [year] o!d 
evidence out of court. ... Counsel failed to argue to keep prior record out of court 
records." (R., pp.5-6.) In the affidavit accompanying the pro se petition, Mr. Wagner 
added, "My attorney ... did not argue to keep a 13 year old felony conviction from being 
used against me. Further he allowed the prosecuting attorney to rely solely upon my 
criminal record for a conviction rather than any evidence in the present case." (R., p.9.) 
Because the thrust of Mr. Wagner's claim was unclear, post conviction counsel sought 
to clarify the claim. 
As such, post conviction counsel explained that the claim Mr. Wagner intended to 
pursue was that he "was led to believe his history would be admitted at trial, the jury 
would convict him because of his [criminal] history, and he would suffer a far worse fate 
than what was contemplated by the plea agreement. The Petitioner pied this in his 
petition as: Trial Counsel having failed to keep the information 'out' as he should have." 
(R., p.56.) Post conviction counsel maintained, "Petitioner asks this court to deny 
the State's request to dismiss and allow the matter to go to evidentiary hearing." 
(R., pp.56-57.) 
Post conviction counsel provided an additional explanation of his clarification of 
the issue at the summary dismissal hearing: 
16 
With regard to the prior history -- the prior history from the state of 
New York,[4] I explained to my client that it probably wouldn't come in 
in [sic] trial unless it were 404(b) evidence and it were somehow attached 
to be a common scheme or plan. 
I certainly conceded in my memorandum that the Court absolutely 
would consider that type of information at sentencing. It's absolutely 
appropriate for the court to consider at sentencing. And I'm certain that 
[the prosecutor] would have and did both highlight his criminal history as 
an aggravating feature at sentencing in this particular case. 
But I think the way I explained it in terms of interpreting the pro se 
petition that's been filed before Your Honor was that (trial counsel] said 
that you [Mr. Wagner] would be facing a much worse outcome and that 
you can't take the case to trial because of your prior history. And I think 
what my client heard was: I won't [take] the case to trial, and you need to 
plead guilty and accept this offer. 
At least that's the way he has explained it to me. I realize that, in 
and of itself isn't grounds for ineffective assistance of counsei. But that's 
certainly the way Mr. Wagner would want anyone reading his affidavit and 
petition to appreciate the nature of the allegation that he's making. 
I also brought up the issue of voluntariness, intelligence, and 
knowing making a plea. I think Mr. Wagner believes he was duped into 
pleading guilty, and he would want this Court to deny the State's request 
to dismiss and allow him to proceed to an evidentiary hearing. 
(Tr., Vol.2, p.6, L:15 - p.7, L.20.) As such, post conviction counsel framed the argument 
Mr. Wagner was pursuing as an allegation that the prior history would not have been 
admissible at trial and trial counsel was ineffective for not arguing that point. (R., p.56.) 
Post conviction counsel also argued that there was a basis for trial counsel to have 
made that argument: "I explained to my client that [the prior record] probably wouldn't 
come in in [sic] trial unless it were 404(b) evidence and it were somehow attached to be 
a common scheme or plan." (Tr., Vol.2, p.6, Ls.16-19.) On that claim, post conviction 
counsel maintained that Mr. Wagner should receive an evidentiary hearing. (R., p.57; 
Tr., Vol.2, p.7, Ls.15-20.) 
4 Only one of the prior convictions was from New York; the second was from Virginia. 
(See, e.g., R., pp.65-66.) 
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Looking at post conviction counsel's entire argument, it becomes clear that post 
conviction counsel's concessions only re!ate to potential interpretations of tho claim 
that Mr. Wagner was not, in fact, pursuing. For example, post conviction counsel 
explained that Mr. Wagner was not arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for not 
keeping the prior convictions out of the sentencing proceedings. (R., p.56; Tr., Vol.2, 
p.6, Ls.20-23.) In fact, Mr. Wagner alleged as much in the affidavit he filed after the 
district court issued its notice of intent to summarily dismiss his petition: "2. My Trial 
Counsel told me my prior record would cause me to lose at jury trial. 3. I only plead 
[sic] guilty because Trial Counsel told me I would lose at jury trial. ... 6. I would have 
asked the case be tried to a jury, but Trial Counsel advised me I would lose because of 
my prior record." (R., pp. 73-74.) Therefore, he "conceded" the prior convictions were 
appropriately considered during the sentencing phase of the proceedings. (Tr., Vol.2, 
p.6, Ls.20-22.) Similarly, post conviction counsel explained that Mr. Wagner was not 
arguing that trial counsel forced him to plead guilty by saying that he would not try the 
case, since post conviction counsel believed that such a claim would not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel.5 (Tr., Vol.2, p.7, Ls.2-11.) 
5 Post conviction counsel was mistaken in that assertion. The defendant has the right to 
decide whether or not to take a case to trial. See, e.g., State v. Swan, 108 Idaho 963, 
965-66 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that trial counsel cannot waive the right to a trial, the 
defendant must do that personally). Certainly, counsel may offer advice in that regard, 
but ultimately, the decision belongs to the defendant. See id. Therefore, trial counsel's 
refusal to try to the case despite the defendant's wishes would constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel. However, as the State points out, post conviction counsel 
conceded that particular argument - that counsel forced him to plead guilty by saying he 
would not try the case. Therefore, were Mr. Wagner attempting to pursue that particular 
claim on appeal, the State's argument would be well taken. But since Mr. Wagner is not 
pursuing that particular claim, the State's argument - that this Court cannot consider the 
merits of Mr. Wagner's claim because post conviction counsel conceded the point - is 
mistaken. 
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On appeal, Mr. Wagner continues to pursue the issue post conviction counsel 
raised: his trial attorney's performance was objectively unreasonable because trial 
counsel did not fight to keep Mr. Wagner's criminal record from being declared 
admissible at trial, even though Idaho Supreme Court precedent on point reveals that 
he would have been successful. Since that argument was never waived, it is properly 
raised on appeal. As such, this Court should consider the merits of that claim. 
2. Counsel's Failure To Challenge The Admissibility Of Mr. Wagner's Prior 
Record For Trial Purposes Was Objectively Unreasonable And Prejudicial 
Mr. Wagner contends that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
because his counsel provided him with erroneous information during the plea bargaining 
process. For example, according to Mr. Wagner's affidavit, "[m]y Trial Counsel told me 
my prior criminal record would cause me to lose at trial."6 (R., p. 73.) That advice was 
objectively unreasonable since the Idaho Supreme Court has limited the scope of 
common scheme or plan evidence to only those cases where "the commission of two or 
more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other." 
State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 54-55 (2009) (emphasis from original) (quoting 
State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 750-51 (1991), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991 )). 7 This means that there must be "'evidence of a 
6 The record supports Mr. Wagner's allegation in this regard, as it demonstrates that his 
concern - that his prior record could be introduced as evidence at trial - was legitimate. 
The State had filed a motion to allow them to present that evidence to the jury under 
I.R.E. 404(b) as evidence of a common scheme or plan. (Supp. R., pp.56-60.) 
Therefore, Mr. Wagner's allegation - that trial counsel told him this evidence would 
cause him to lose at trial - is an assertion that trial counsel told Mr. Wagner that his 
~rior record would be admitted at trial. 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Grist on this point. State v. Joy, 155 
Idaho 1, 9 (2013). 
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comrnon scheme or plan beyond the bare fact that' the defendant has committed 
the same kind of misconduct in the past." State v. Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 9 (2013) 
(quoting State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 668 (2010)) (emphasis added). 
This means that, "at a minimum, there must be evidence of a common scheme or 
plan beyond the bare fact that sexual misconduct has occurred with children in the 
past." Johnson, 148 Idaho at 668. Thus, the Idaho Supreme Court held in Johnson, for 
example, that the fact that the victims were similar in age, the defendant had a similar 
relationship to the victims, and the touching was similar in nature was not sufficient to 
establish that the evidence was relevant to some non-propensity purpose. Id. at 669. 
This case is indistinguishable from Johnson in that regard. The evidence from 
Mr. Wagner's prior criminal record that the State sought to admit was that Mr. Wagner 
had similar contact with an unrelated victim fourteen years previous in a different state. 
(Supp. R., pp.57-58.) Furthermore, as the State pointed out in the initial appellate 
briefing, Mr. Wagner's prior convictions dealt with acts that "appeared to be an 
almost impulsive manner." (Resp. Br., p.12; see also Resp. Br., p.12 (referring to 
"[Mr.] Wagner's previous conviction for impulsively molesting [a child]").) When a 
person acts impulsively, they are acting on "[a] sudden urge or inclination that prompts 
an unplanned action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 344 (3rd pocket ed. 2006) (emphasis 
added). Thus, impulsive actions are, by definition, not part of some preconceived plan 
or scheme. See id. As a result, the only thing relating those prior incidents to the 
present offense is the bare fact that Mr. Wagner had committed the same kind of 
misconduct in the past. That fact is not sufficient to make the prior convictions 
admissible under I.RE. 404(b). See, e.g., Johnson, 148 Idaho at 669. 
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As such, the two events were not related to each other in a way that the proof of 
one would tend to establish the other, and so, it is precisely the type of propensity 
evidence that the Idaho Supreme Court had held to be inadmissible in Grist and Joy. 
Therefore, counsel's advice that Mr. Wagner should take the plea because he would 
lose at trial based on the evidence of his past record - was objectively unreasonable; 
Mr. Wagner's prior record was not admissible at trial. 
Nevertheless, the district court summarily dismissed Mr. Wagner's claim in this 
regard. It did so because it determined that Mr. Wagner's prior record was 
appropriately admitted before the sentencing judge. (Tr., Vol.2, p.6, L.20 - p.7, L.1; R., 
p.69.) However, that analysis is irrelevant to Mr. Wagner's complaint regarding what 
trial counsel told him he could expect "at trial." (R., p.73 (emphasis added). Therefore, 
the district court's conclusions about the propriety of admitting Mr. Wagner's prior record 
at sentencing is irrelevant to the issue Mr. Wagner presented in his petition. As such, 
the district court's rationale does not justify its decision to summarily dismiss Mr. 
Wagner's petition. Therefore, Mr. Wagner presented sufficient facts to create a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether trial counsel's advice in this regard fell below a 
reasonable standard of performance. 
C. Mr. Wagner Raised A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That His Trial Attorney 
Made An Erroneous Assertion Regarding The Sentence He Would Receive If He 
Did Not Plead Guilty 
Mr. Wagner also contended that he was not adequately informed about the 
potential punishments during his consideration of whether to accept the plea deal. 
Specifically, he alleged that "Trial Counsel told me I would be sentenced to life in prison 
if I lost at trial." (R., p. 73.) As that statement appears in a verified affidavit and is an 
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assertion of fact within Mr. Wagner's personal knowledge, it is evidence which the 
district court was required to consider in its summary dismissal calculus. See, e.g., 
Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 155 (2007). 
In Baldwin, the Idaho Supreme Court explained, "Baldwin presents his own 
affidavit describing his version of the interaction [in question]. Baldwin's affidavit sets 
fotih facts that would be admissible at trial. Thus, because Baldwin's Petition and 
Affidavit present facts that would entitle Baldwin to relief, if he were able to prove them 
at a hearing, the district court erred when it summarily dismissed the petition." Id. 
(emphasis added). Like the petitioner in Baldwin, Mr. Wagner alleged facts in his own 
affidavit that demonstrated his attorney performed deficiently. Therefore, just as in 
Baldwin, because Mr. Wagner's petition and affidavit present admissible facts that 
would entitle him to relief, if he were able to prove them at a hearing, the district court 
erred when it summarily dismissed the petition. 
Additionally, while a life sentence may have been a potential penalty with the 
sentencing enhancement still on the table (see Supp. R., pp.51-52 (the State's motion 
for leave to file information, part 11, based on Mr. Wagner's prior record)), a life sentence 
was not required (certainly, a fixed life sentence was not required). (See, e.g., Supp. 
Tr., p.10, Ls.18-20 (the district court informing Mr. Wagner that the "maximum possible 
penalty" was life in prison) (emphasis added).) As such, counsel's representation that 
Mr. Wagner "would be sentenced to life in prison" was erroneous. (R., p.73 (emphasis 
added).) At the summary dismissal stage, the district court is required to construe the 
facts in the light most favorable to the defendant. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 
793 (2004) (quoting Saykahmchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 321 (1995)). Applying that 
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rule in this case means that, at the summary dismissal stage, the district court was 
required to consider the claim as though Mr. Wagner was correct, and trial counsel told 
him that he would be sentenced to a life term. That phrasing ··would be" - indicates 
that the life term was more than a mere possibility, but rather, was definitely the 
sentence that would have been imposed if he did not plead guilty. Thus, by telling 
Mr. Wagner he "would be" sentenced to a life term if he did not plead guilty, trial counsel 
was promising a particular sentence would result from Mr. Wagner's choice on the plea 
agreement. 
When a promise that a particular sentence will result is made to the defendant 
and that promise induces him to plead guilty, the defendant is entitled to relief. See 
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 137 (2009); Machibroda v. United States, 368 
U.S. 487, 493 C1962); State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 256 (2012) (adopting the 
rationale from Puckett and applying it to plea agreements and promises made therein). 
Therefore, as in Baldwin, Mr. Wagner's affidavit created, at least, a genuine issue of 
material fact that his attorney performed in an objectively unreasonable manner by 
telling him that he "would be" sentenced to life in prison if he did not accept the plea 
offer. 
D. Mr. Wagner Raised A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That He Was Prejudiced 
By Trial Counsel's Deficient Performance 
Mr. Wagner also alleged that he was prejudiced by counsel's objectively 
unreasonable performance. Besides the manifest injustice and due process violation 
caused by his plea being entered without the necessary voluntariness, see, e.g., 
Heredia, 144 Idaho at 97, Mr. Wagner was also prejudiced because, but for counsel's 
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advice about his potential trial, the potential sentence, and the offered plea deal, he 
would have demanded a jury trial. (R., p.74.) He feit "duped" into pleading guilty. 
(R., p.57.) That allegation estabiishes a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
errors, Mr. Wagner would not have pleaded guilty when he did, but rather, would have 
insisted on going to trial. Compare Booth v State, 151 Idaho 612, 621 (2011 ). That 
allegation is uncontradicted in the record. (See generally R.) Therefore, that allegation 
in Mr. Wagner's affidavit is sufficient for Mr. Wagner's petition to create a genuine issue 
of material fact as to the second prong of the Strickland test. See Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 
155 (holding that a defendant's affidavit alone is sufficient to create a genuine issue of 
material fact). Since he has aileged facts demonstrating objectively unreasonable 
performance and prejudice, Mr. Wagner petition created at least one genuine issue of 
material fact, and, therefore, he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing in this matter. 
The fact that there was evidence in the guilty plea colloquy and questionnaire 
which potentially contradicted some of Mr. Wagner's allegations does not change the 
conclusion that Mr. Wagner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The Idaho Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held that, at the summary dismissal stage of post conviction 
proceedings, the district court is required to not just construe, but liberally construe, all 
the inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See, e.g., Dunlap v. State, 155 Idaho 
345, 361 (2013); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792; Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 321. 
However, "the trial judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn 
from uncontroverted evidentiary facts." State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008). 
In this case, the district court misapplied this rule. It relied on evidence emerging 
from Mr. Wagner's answers in the guilty plea colloquy and questionnaire as the 
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uncontroverted evidence from 111hich it could draw reasonable inferences to undermine 
Mr. Wagner's claims. (R., pp.69-7·1.) However, Mr. Wagner challenged the reliability of 
his answers in the guilty plea colloquy and questionnaire by asserting in his affidavit that 
he was trying to give the "correct" (as opposed to the "accurate") answers. (R., pp.73-
74.) Mr. Wagner alleged that the reason his answers were inaccurate was because, in 
discussing the matter with counsel, counsel told him that if he did not give the "correct" 
answer, his plea would be rejected. (R., p.74.) And, as the Idaho Supreme Court held 
in Baldwin, Mr. Wagner's verified allegation of fact alone is sufficient to establish a 
genuine issue of material fact on that issue. See Baldwin, ·145 Idaho at 155. Therefore, 
the evidence from the guilty plea coiloquy and questionnaire was disputed. 
As a result, the district court was not free to draw any inference from that 
evidence; it was required to construe it in the light most favorable to Mr. Wagner. 
See, e.g., Dunlap, 155 Idaho at 361. Furthermore, by using the disputed responses in 
the guilty plea colloquy and questionnaire as a basis to summarily dismiss Mr. Wagner's 
petition, the district court was essentially making a credibility determination that those 
answers were more reliable than Mr. Wagner's statement under oath in his affidavit. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that "judging credibility is not appropriate 
during summary judgment proceedings where no evidentiary hearing has been held." 
Vanderford Co., Inc., v. Knudson, 150 Idaho 664, 674 (2011 ). This rule holds true "even 
when the court will serve as trier of fact, credibility determinations 'should not be made 
on summary judgment .... "' Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 
411, 419 (2012) (quoting Argyle v. S/emaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670 (Ct. App. 1984)). 
Therefore, the district court's determination that, since it was the trier of fact, it could 
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make those determinations at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings (see 
R., p. 71 ), was clearly wrong. 3 As a result, its reliance on the contested answers in the 
plea colloquy and questionnaire as a viable basis to summarily dismiss Mr. Wagner's 
petition was erroneous and should be reversed. 
Applying the proper standards in this case, it is clear that Mr. Wagner's petition 
sets forth a genuine issue of material fact as to whether trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance as Mr. Wagner decided whether to exercise his constitutional right 
to a jury trial or to accept the pending plea offer, and so, rendered his plea not 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Therefore, the decision to summarily dismiss 
his petition was erroneous. 
8 The district court's determination that Mr. Wagner presented no new evidence after 
the district court entered is notice of intent to summarily dismiss the petition is also 
clearly wrong because Mr. Wagner filed an affidavit making new or additional 
allegations in support of his petition, including the allegation that the answers in the plea 
colloquy and questionnaire were not accurate, after the notice of intent was filed. 
(R., pp.64-72 (the notice of intent to summarily dismiss filed on July 31, 2013); 
R., pp.73-74 (Mr. Wagner's affidavit filed on August 19, 2013).) 
26 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Wagner respectfully requests that this Court grant the petition for rehearing, 
witt1draw the Opinion in this case, and determine whether the district couri properly 
summarily dismissed his petition for post conviction relief based on the grounds for 
which he had appropriate notice and the opportunity to be heard. 
On rehearing, Mr. Wagner respectfully requests that this Court reverse the order 
summarily dismissing his petition, vacate the final judgment, and remand this case for 
an evidentiary hearing because the facts, when liberally viewed in the light most 
favorable to him, establish a genuine issue of material fact. 
DATED this 2·1 st day of April, 2015. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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